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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is 
intended to promote the amicable resolution of cases.  
Although it usually serves its intended purpose, Rule 68 
presents a trap for the unwary.  This trap manifests itself most 
frequently when a defendant erroneously believes that an 
accepted Rule 68 offer of judgment finally resolves a civil 
action, only to be assessed substantial attorney‟s fees and 
costs thereafter by the court. 
 In this appeal, Plaintiff Roberto Lima argues that the 
Rule 68 offer of judgment he accepted did not include 
attorney‟s fees and costs.  As in many cases, the question is 
significant because counsel for Lima seek fees well in excess 







 The historical facts of this case are incidental to the 
issue presented on appeal, so we summarize them only 
briefly.  In September 2007, a photographer working for 
Lima‟s Portuguese-language newspaper, Brazilian Voice, 
discovered and photographed a decomposed body covered by 
debris in the Ironbound section of Newark, New Jersey.  
Lima reported the incident to police and showed them the 
crime scene.  At the crime scene, two police officers allegedly 
intimidated Lima and the photographer, seized the camera, 
and ordered Lima not to publish any photographs of the 
scene.  At the precinct office, Lima gave police a statement 
but refused to turn over the original photographs (though he 
offered to make copies for them).  Lima further alleged that 
he was handcuffed and released from custody only after he 
agreed to turn over all copies of the photographs.  The police 
then followed him to his office where they seized CDs 
containing digital copies of the pictures. 
 In January 2008, Lima filed suit in New Jersey District 
Court against the Newark Police Department and certain 
police officers.  He amended his complaint once to add an 
additional officer, and then again, in January 2009, adding 
Police Director Garry McCarthy, another officer, and a 
Monell claim against the City of Newark (collectively, 
Newark). 
 Lima‟s second amended complaint stated seven causes 
of action arising under both federal and state law and 
concluded with a “PRAYER FOR RELIEF” stating: 
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 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully 
requests judgment against the Defendants as 
follows: 
  (a) Compensatory and consequential 
damages in an amount to be 
determined at trial; 
  (b) Punitive damages on all claims 
allowed by law, in an amount to 
be determined at trial; 
  (c) Attorney‟s fees and costs 
associated with this action; 
  (d) Any further relief as this Court 
deems just and proper and any 
other relief as allowed by law. 
B 
 Before discovery commenced, and before filing his 
second amended complaint, Lima offered to settle the case for 
“$85,000, and [an] admission of the event; an apology; and 
consent to training.”  After some discovery, the filing of the 
second amended complaint, further settlement negotiations, 
and a failed attempt at mediation—during which Lima‟s 
demand went as high as $150,000 and Newark‟s offer went as 
high as $50,000—Newark made a Rule 68 offer of judgment 
(Offer).  The Offer was attached to a November 8, 2009 email 
stating:  “Attached is an Offer of Judgment from the City of 
Newark and Garry McCarthy.  The offer is, however, as to all 
defendants and all claims.  The City makes this offer with the 
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intention and expectation that, if accepted, this litigation will 
be resolved in its entirety.”  The Offer itself stated: 
Pursuant to Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Defendants City of Newark 
(and improperly pled “Newark Police 
Department”), and Garry McCarthy, hereby 
offers [sic] to allow Judgment to be entered 
against these defendants in this action in the 
amount of $55,000.00, including all of 
Plaintiff‟s claims for relief against all 
defendants, including those not represented by 
this counsel.  This offer of judgment is made for 
the purposes specified in Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 68, and is not to be construed as 
either an admission that any of the defendants 
are liable in this action, or that the Plaintiff has 
suffered any damage.  This Offer of Judgment 
shall not be filed with the Court unless (a) 
accepted or (b) in a proceeding to determine 
costs (which includes counsel fees that could be 
awarded pursuant to statute). 
 Lima timely accepted the Offer and simultaneously 
filed a request for judgment seeking “judgment against 
Defendants in the amount of $55,000, with costs to be taxed 
by the Court upon application by Plaintiff pursuant to Rule 
54(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 42 U.S.C. § 
1988.”  Upon receiving Lima‟s acceptance of the Offer, 
Newark promptly wrote to the Magistrate Judge assigned to 
the case, stating: 
 Just to be clear, the Defendants‟ Offer of 
Judgment was for „all of Plaintiff‟s claims 
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against all defendants.‟  There should be no 
confusion about any remaining claims, whether 
for costs or anything else; no such claims 
remain.  But if there is any confusion, let me 
clarify that the Defendants‟ Offer of Judgment 
was not designed to expose the citizens of the 
City of Newark to any further expense other 
than the $55,000 offered. 
 If the Plaintiff intends to seek costs and 
attorneys fees, the Defendants seek immediate 
relief and clarification from Your Honor. 
Lima‟s counsel responded the next day, countering Newark 
by asserting:  “The Offer and Plaintiff‟s Acceptance are 
binding, so that the only remaining question for resolution is 
the amount of costs and fees to which Plaintiff is entitled.” 
 After receiving the aforementioned correspondence, 
the Magistrate Judge ordered counsel to meet and confer, but 
they were unable to come to an agreement.  Because the 
parties could not resolve the dispute over fees without judicial 
intervention, the District Court ordered briefing on the matter 
and, on February 22, 2010, entered an order: (1) granting 
Lima‟s “Request for Judgment in the amount of $55,000” and 
(2) denying his “Request to File an Application for Attorneys‟ 
Fees . . . because . . . the Offer of Judgment included 
attorneys‟ fees.”  Lima v. Newark Police Dep’t, No. 08-426, 
slip op. (D.N.J. Feb. 22, 2010) (Lima). 
 In support of its decision, the District Court reasoned 
that “Newark was not silent as to costs, but rather used three 
different phrases to state that the offer was a lump sum, single 
offer to cover all claims in the case and end the litigation 
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while specifically disclaiming any liability.”  Id. at 2-3.  The 
three phrases the District Court found significant were: 
(1) „Judgment to be entered against these 
defendants in this action in the amount of 
$55,000, including all of Plaintiff‟s claims for 
relief against all defendants,‟ in the Offer of 
Judgment, [which] explicitly covers Prayer for 
Relief subpart (c) in the Complaint which 
claims the following relief: „(c) attorney‟s fees 
and costs associated with this action‟; 
(2) „This . . . is not to be construed as either an 
admission that any of the defendants are liable 
in this action, or that the Plaintiff has suffered 
any damage,‟ in the Offer of Judgment [, which] 
is a statement that disclaims plaintiff as a 
“prevailing party” under Buckhannon 
principles; 
(3) „[I]f accepted, this litigation will be resolved 
in its entirety,‟ in the email conveying the Offer, 
[which] further confirms that Newark‟s offer 
precludes additional litigation regarding 
whether Plaintiff is a “prevailing party” to earn 
an attorney‟s fee award; 
Id.  For these reasons, the District Court held that the “Offer 
of Judgment, as accepted, is inclusive of costs and fees.”  Id. 






 The District Court had jurisdiction over Lima‟s federal 
claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and supplemental jurisdiction 
over his state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).  Lima 
timely appealed the final order of the District Court and we 
have jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1291. 
 “We have plenary review over both legal questions 
regarding the interpretation of Rule 68 and the construction of 
the offer of judgment.”  Le v. Univ. of Pa., 321 F.3d 403, 
406 (3d Cir. 2003).  
III 
A 
 Rule 68 permits a defendant to include all fees and costs in 
an offer of judgment.  The rule states, in relevant part: 
(a) Making an Offer; Judgment on an 
Accepted Offer.  
More than 10 days before the trial 
begins, a party defending against a claim may 
serve on an opposing party an offer to allow 
judgment on specified terms, with the costs then 
accrued. If, within 10 days after being served, 
the opposing party serves written notice 
accepting the offer, either party may then file 
the offer and notice of acceptance, plus proof of 
service. The clerk must then enter judgment.  
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FED. R. CIV. P. 68 (2009) (italics added).
1
 
 In Marek v. Chesney, 473 U.S. 1 (1985), the Supreme 
Court explained that the phrase “with the costs accrued” 
means that (1) where the underlying statute defines “costs” to 
include attorney‟s fees (as § 1988 does), those fees are 
included as costs for purposes of Rule 68, id. at 10, and (2) 
defendants can make lump sum offers that do not distinguish 
between the claim and the costs, id. at 6.  The Court 
explained: 
The critical feature of [the portion of Rule 68 
stating that a defendant may make an offer 
“with costs then accrued”] is that the offer be 
one that allows judgment to be taken against the 
defendant for both the damages caused by the 
challenged conduct and the costs then accrued.  
In other words, the drafters‟ concern was not so 
much with the particular components of offers, 
but with the judgments to be allowed against 
defendants.  If an offer recites that costs are 
included or specifies an amount for costs, and 
the plaintiff accepts the offer, the judgment will 
necessarily include costs; if the offer does not 
state that costs are included and an amount for 
costs is not specified, the court will be obliged 
by the terms of the Rule to include in its 
judgment an additional amount which in its 
discretion, it determines to be sufficient to cover 
the costs . . . .   
                                                 
1
 Rule 68 was amended December 2009 to change the 
timeframe from 10 to 14 days. 
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Id. (italics in original, underline added). 
 In  Le v. University of Pennsylvania, 321 F.3d 403 (3d 
Cir. 2003), we had occasion to apply Marek to a Rule 68 offer 
of judgment.  There, we stated: “the Supreme Court . . . found 
that „[a]s long as the offer does not implicitly or explicitly 
provide that the judgment does not include costs‟ an offer is 
valid and presumes the defendant will pay costs.”  Id. at 409 
(quoting Marek, 473 U.S. at 6) (alteration in original).  
Accordingly, we held that a Rule 68 offer of judgment “for 
the total amount of $50,000, plus costs then accrued” 
unambiguously stated an offer of $50,000 plus costs to be 
determined by the court because the “plain language of the 
offer dictates the result,” even though another part of the offer 
stated that “„the offer [of $50,000 plus costs] shall represent 
and fix the total liability of the [defendants] for any and all of 
plaintiff‟s loss, claims, damages, costs, attorneys‟ fees, or any 
other amounts or expenses recoverable, or potentially 
recoverable, in this action.‟”  Id. (alterations in original). 
 Le‟s holding was based on Marek and on principles 
embodied in our prior cases interpreting settlement offers, 
decided both before and after Marek.  Before Marek, we held 
that a suit for attorney‟s fees is foreclosed only when 
expressly stipulated in the settlement agreement: “If the 
parties cannot agree on counsel fees and the losing party 
wishes to foreclose a suit . . . for attorneys fees, it must insist 
that a stipulation to that effect be placed in the settlement 
agreement.”  El Club Del Barrio, Inc. v. United Cmty. Corps., 
735 F.2d 98, 101 (3d Cir. 1984).  We rejected a “silence 
equals waiver” rule and held that “extrinsic evidence such as 
the course of negotiations” is irrelevant.  Id. at 100.  See also 
Torres v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 189 F.3d 331, 333 (3d Cir. 
1999) (applying the same rule post-Marek). 
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 After Marek was decided, we considered whether a 
plaintiff was entitled to attorney‟s fees under § 1988 
following a non-Rule 68 settlement offer.  Ashley v. Atl. 
Richfield Co., 794 F.2d 128 (3d Cir. 1986).  In Ashley we 
noted: 
Where the plaintiff does so prevail, however, in 
the absence of an express waiver, she will be 
deemed to have retained her statutory right to an 
award of reasonable attorney‟s fees. Therefore, 
where a defendant seeks to settle its total 
liability on a claim, it shall be incumbent upon 
the defendant to secure an express waiver of 
attorney‟s fees.  Silence will not suffice. 
Id. at 138-39.  Although the settlement offer in Ashley did 
disclaim liability for “costs,” we held that it was not 
controlled by Marek because the settlement offer was not 
made pursuant to Rule 68.  Id. at 140-41 (citing Marek, 473 
U.S. at 6). 
 Similarly, in Torres we held that a plaintiff was 
entitled to attorney‟s fees after a non-Rule 68 settlement 
agreement, despite an extensive release of  
all claims, charges, or demands asserted or 
assertable in the Pending Lawsuit, and all 
claims, charges, or demands arising from or 
relating to Plaintiff's relationship of any kind 
with the Released Parties, including without 
limitation any rights or claims Plaintiff may 
have under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 




189 F.3d at 333.  We determined that this language did not 
“„clearly‟ waive plaintiff‟s right to attorney‟s fees.”  Id. at 
333 n.3 (quoting El Club Del Barrio, 735 F.2d at 99).  We 
also held that the “clear import of El Club Del Barrio and 
Ashley is that it does not matter whether the parties discussed 
the issue of attorney‟s fees or believed the settlement 
agreement waived such a claim.  All that matters is whether 
the agreement expressly stipulates that the prevailing party‟s 
claim for fees is waived.  If it does not, then the claim 
survives.”  Id. at 334. 
 Our sister courts of appeals have read Marek to require 
that a Rule 68 offer of judgment must explicitly state that 
costs are included; otherwise those costs must be determined 
by the court.  See McCain v. Detroit II Auto Fin. Ctr., 378 
F.3d 561, 564 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that defendant‟s 
“silence on the subject of costs in its Rule 68 offer means that 
true costs are recoverable,” although attorney‟s fees were not 
recoverable because the operative statute did not classify 
them as costs); Nordby v. Anchor Hocking Packaging Co., 
199 F.3d 390, 391-93 (7th Cir. 1999) (“[A]mbiguities in Rule 
68 offers are to be resolved against the offerors,” but the 
instant offer—for “judgment in the amount of $56,003.00 
plus $1,000 in costs as one total sum as to all counts of the 
amended complaint” was unambiguous and therefore 
included costs and fees.); Webb v. James, 147 F.3d 617, 622 
(7th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he effect of Marek is clear.  Rule 68 
offers must include costs.  If the offer is silent as to costs, the 
court may award an additional amount to cover them.  Where 
costs are defined in the underlying statute to include 
attorney‟s fees, the court may award fees as part of costs as 
well.”); Erdman v. Cochise County, 926 F.2d 877, 879-81 
(9th Cir. 1991) (holding that a defendant‟s drafting error 
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failing to explicitly include fees would be held against it and 
plaintiff could seek additional award of fees); Arencibia v. 
Miami Shoes, Inc., 113 F.3d 1212, 1214 (11th Cir. 1997) 
(“The Supreme Court has held that when a Rule 68 offer is 
silent as to costs, the district court should award appropriate 
costs in addition to the amount of the offer.”). 
 In sum, a valid Rule 68 offer of judgment necessarily 
includes costs and attorney‟s fees either explicitly or 
implicitly.  When the costs are stated explicitly in the offer of 
judgment, the offeror is not subject to any additional liability.  
When, however, the offer of judgment is silent as to fees and 
costs, they must be fixed by the court after the offer of 
judgment is accepted.  Extrinsic evidence of the parties‟ 
subjective intent is not admissible to determine whether a 
Rule 68 offer of judgment includes costs. 
B 
 Here, the District Court found that Newark‟s Offer 
included attorney‟s fees because it “was not silent as to 
costs.”  In concluding that Newark “used three different 
phrases to state that the offer was a lump sum, single offer to 
cover all claims in the case and end the litigation while 
specifically disclaiming any liability,” the District Court was 
influenced by improper considerations and misread the plain 
language of the Offer.  Lima, No. 08-426 at 3.  Although the 
District Court‟s conclusion is understandable inasmuch as it 
is possible that Newark intended attorney‟s fees to be 
included in the Offer, we hold that the District Court 
committed an error of law because the Offer did not explicitly 
include attorney‟s fees or costs. 
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 As an initial matter, we note that the District Court 
erred by considering evidence extrinsic to the Offer in 
violation of El Club Del Barrio, 735 F.2d at 100, and by 
considering the subjective intentions of the parties in 
violation of Torres, 189 F.3d at 333.  The District Court 
found that the phrase “„if accepted, this litigation will be 
resolved in its entirety,‟ in the email conveying the Offer, 
further confirms that Newark‟s offer precludes additional 
litigation regarding whether Plaintiff is a „prevailing party‟ to 
earn an attorney‟s fee award.”  Lima, No. 08-426 at 3 
(emphasis added).  This was error because an email to which 
the Offer is attached is extrinsic to the Offer; it does not 
inform whether the Offer itself explicitly includes fees and 
costs.  El Club Del Barrio, 735 F.2d at 100. 
 In fact, the complete sentence from the email 
conveying the offer—“The City makes this offer with the 
intention and expectation that, if accepted, this litigation will 
be resolved in its entirety.”—describes Newark‟s “intention 
and expectation,” not a term of the Offer.  The parties‟ 
subjective intentions and expectations are not  proper factors 
to consider when interpreting an offer of judgment.  See 
Torres, 189 F.3d at 334 (The “clear import of El Club Del 
Barrio and Ashley is that it does not matter whether the 
parties discussed the issue of attorney‟s fees or believed the 
settlement agreement waived such a claim.  All that matters is 
whether the agreement expressly stipulates that the prevailing 
party‟s claim for fees is waived.  If it does not, then the claim 
survives.”).  For the same reason, we give no weight to 
Newark‟s argument that various Newark principals filed 
affidavits stating that they intended fees to be included, while 
Lima did not file any affidavits as to his subjective 
understanding of the offer at the time he accepted it.  
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Appellee Br. 28-30 (“[Q]uite simply, neither Plaintiff nor his 
counsel ever said anything about what they believed the Offer 
of Judgment meant, or did not mean.  No one ever said they 
believed it included costs, or that it did not include costs.”).  
Neither the email accompanying the Offer nor the affidavits 
can be considered because they are extrinsic evidence of the 
subjective intentions of a party. 
 Perhaps influenced by these improper considerations, 
the District Court erred in its reading of the Offer.  The Court 
determined that the phrase “„Judgment to be entered against 
these defendants in this action in the amount of $55,000, 
including all of Plaintiff‟s claims for relief against all 
defendants,‟ in the Offer of Judgment, explicitly covers 
Prayer for Relief subpart (c) in the Complaint which claims 
the following relief: „(c) attorney‟s fees and costs associated 
with this action.‟”  Lima, No. 08-426 at 3.  Thus, the District 
Court found that “claims for relief” included the “Prayer for 
Relief,” even though the “Prayer for Relief” was not part of a 
particular claim or count in the complaint. 
 As a matter of law, it cannot be said that the 
ambiguous, catchall phrase “all of Plaintiff‟s claims for 
relief” explicitly covers attorney‟s fees and costs.  For that 
reason, it does not fulfill the requirement established by El 
Club Del Barrio, Marek, and Torres.   Nor is it the most 
reasonable reading of the phrase in light of Supreme Court 
precedent.  A request for attorney‟s fees under § 1988 is 
collateral to the main cause of action and attorney‟s fees 
cannot “fairly be characterized as an element of „relief‟ 
indistinguishable from other elements.”  White v. N.H. Dep’t 
of Emp’t Sec., 455 U.S. 445, 452 (1982).  “Unlike other 
judicial relief, the attorney‟s fees allowed under § 1988 are 
not compensation for the injury giving rise to an action.  
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Their award is uniquely separable from the cause of action to 
be proved at trial.”  Id. 
 The District Court also found that the phrase “„[t]his . . 
. is not to be construed as either an admission that any of the 
defendants are liable in this action, or that the Plaintiff has 
suffered any damage,‟ in the Offer of Judgment is a statement 
that disclaims plaintiff as a „prevailing party‟ under 
Buckhannon principles.”  Lima, No. 08-426 at 3; see 
Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. DHHS, 532 
U.S. 598, 603 (2001).   The District Court reasoned from this 
standard disclaimer of liability that “an application for 
attorneys‟ fees in this case would require significant 
additional litigation to determine whether, under the standards 
developed in [Buckhannon] and Truesdell v. Philadelphia 
Housing Authority, 290 F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 2002), Lima would 
be considered a „prevailing party‟ entitled to an award of 
attorneys‟ fees in this case.”  Lima, No. 08-426 at 4.  In 
making this determination, the District Court once again 
appears to have been influenced by Newark‟s intentions—
namely to conclude the litigation—from which it reasoned 
that Newark could not have meant to leave open the 
possibility of further litigation regarding Lima‟s status as a 
prevailing party.  Those intentions should not have been 
considered, and absent that consideration, we cannot say that 
the disclaimer of liability was an explicit statement that the 
Offer included fees and costs. 
 A “„prevailing party‟ is one who has been awarded 
some relief by the court.”  Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603.  “To 
be eligible to make a prevailing-party claim under § 1988, the 
plaintiff must, „at a minimum, ... be able to point to a 
resolution of the dispute which changes the legal relationship 
between itself and the defendant.‟”  Singer Mgmt. 
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Consultants, Inc. v. Milgram, --- F.3d ----, 2011 WL 
2342733, at *4 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (quoting Tex. State 
Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 
792 (1989)).  “The fact that [a party] prevailed through a 
settlement rather than through litigation does not weaken her 
claim to fees.”  Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129 (1980).  
“Nothing in the language of § 1988 conditions the District 
Court‟s power to award fees on full litigation of the issues or 
on a judicial determination that the plaintiff‟s rights have 
been violated.”  Id.  Whether one was the prevailing party 
depends on whether the resolution resulted in a “judicial 
action,” Singer, --- F.3d ----, 2011 WL 2342733, at *4, that 
effected a “material alteration of the legal relationship of the 
parties,” Truesdell, 290 F.3d at 163 (quoting Tex. State 
Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 
792-93 (1989)).  “„[T]he degree of the plaintiff‟s overall 
success goes to the reasonableness of the award . . . not to the 
availability of a fee award vel non.‟”  Truesdell, 290 F.3d at 
166 (quoting Tex. State Teachers, 489 U.S. at 782).  Thus, the 
Offer‟s disclaimer of liability does not establish that it 
included fees and costs, particularly because Lima‟s status as 
a putative prevailing party was to be made after the District 
Court determined whether the Offer included fees, and should 
not have been considered in making that determination in the 
first instance.  Id. 
 Here, the Offer was valid and was silent as to fees and 
costs.  That fact begins and ends our analysis.  In interpreting 
a Rule 68 offer of judgment, courts must not consider 
extrinsic evidence or the intentions of the parties.  Nor can 
they allow their awareness of such irrelevant facts to 
 19 
 





                                                 
 
2
 Newark argues that even if the District Court erred, 
Lima waived his right to appeal because he invited the error.  
After the Offer had been accepted, and while the parties were 
disputing the issue of attorney‟s fees, they also disagreed 
about whether Lima should undergo an independent medical 
examination.  In a joint letter regarding re-scheduling the 
independent medical examination, Lima wrote: 
Plaintiff will receive either (a) $55,000 in toto 
or (b) $55,000 plus reasonable costs and 
attorneys [sic] fees.  Though Defendants offered 
to withdraw the Offer following Plaintiff‟s 
acceptance, Plaintiff declined, willing to accept 
either possibility as ordered by the Court. 
 
The doctrine of “invited error” refers to “[a]n error that a 
party cannot complain of on appeal because the party, 
through conduct, encouraged or prompted the trial court to 
make the erroneous ruling.”  BLACK‟S LAW DICTIONARY 622 
(9th ed. 2009).   That is to say, “[w]hen a litigant takes an 
unequivocal position at trial, he cannot on appeal assume a 
contrary position simply because the decision in retrospect 
was a tactical mistake, or perhaps a candid but regretted 
concession.”  Fleck v. KDI Sylvan Pools, Inc.,  981 F.2d 107, 
116-17 (3d Cir. 1992).  Lima‟s representation in the joint 
letter was neither “an unequivocal position” on this issue nor 
an invitation to the District Court to rule against him.  





 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the order of 
the District Court and remand the matter for a determination 
of reasonable attorney‟s fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1988. 
